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REPUTATION, COMPENSATION, AND PROOF
DAVID A. ANDERSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
The genius of modern tort law is its emphasis on injury. Early
tort law was an adj(nct of criminal law and focused not on injury,
but on wrong. If a court awarded damages, the damages were only
incidental to the criminal prosecution of the perpetrator.' Gradu-
ally, the focus of tort law shifted from wrong to injury, so that tort
law is no longer primarily a scheme for punishing wrongs, but "a
body of law which is directed toward the compensation of individ-
uals ... for losses which they have suffered. ' '2
This focus on injury, rather than on wrong, has made possible
the vast extension of tort liability that has occurred during the last
generation. The most notable example is the field of products lia-
bility, in which injury is now compensable without proof of wrong
in any but the most technical sense.'
The focus on injury is apparent in practice as well as in theory.
Today's tort lawyer is likely to begin his assessment of a potential
case not with theories of liability, but with damages. The lawyer
knows that unless the injury is severe, the dispute probably will
not become a case at all because of the high cost of litigation. Un-
less the damages are substantial, therefore, the lawyer usually will
not reach the liability question. Consequently, modern tort law re-
dresses only the most serious injuries. The rest are handled by in-
surance adjusters, self help, or small claims courts-mechanisms in
* Professor of Law, The University of Texas at Austin. A.B. 1962, Harvard University;
J.D. 1971, University of Texas. Some of the research for this article was done in the fall of
1983 while the author was the Visiting Lee Professor at the Institute of Bill of Rights Law,
Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary. The author is grateful for the
Institute's support. He also wishes to express his gratitude to the research assistants who
contributed to this article: Ms. Beth Schipper of the Marshall-Wythe School of Law, and
Mr. John Parsons and Ms. Teresa Couch of the University of Texas School of Law.
1. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 8-9 (4th ed. 1971).
2. Id. § 1, at 6.
3. See Coleman, The Morality of Strict Tort Liability, 18 WM. & MARY L. REv. 259
(1976); Nickel, Justice in Compensation, 18 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 379 (1976).
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which tort doctrine plays only a supporting role.
Conversely, if the injury is severe, the lawyer recognizes that lia-
bility rules may be expanded to provide a remedy where none ex-
isted before. Thus, if damages are substantial, the attorney may
pursue the case despite unfavorable liability rules. In either event,
practical considerations direct the lawyer's first inquiries toward
the nature of the injury.
This redirection of tort law from wrong to injury has bypassed
defamation. Today, defamation is the only tort that allows sub-
stantial recovery without proof of injury. As Dean McCormick
stated:
[T]he plaintiff is relieved from the necessity of producing any
proof whatsoever that he has been injured. From the fact of the
publication of the defamatory matter by the defendant, damage
to the plaintiff is said to be "presumed," and the jury, without
any further data, is at liberty to assess substantial damages,
upon the assumption that the plaintiff's reputation has been in-
jured and his feelings wounded.4
The presumption of harm often is assumed to be relevant only in
per se cases, but that assumption is not true; in the absence of a
statutory limitation, presumed damages are potentially available in
every libel or slander case. The "special harm" that must be shown
in the non-per se cases is a threshold that must be met, not a limi-
tation on recovery. In those cases, the plaintiff has no cause of ac-
tion without proof of special damage. Once the plaintiff proves
special damage, however, he is entitled not only to those damages,
but to presumed damages as well.5
As Justice Powell said in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,6 the pre-
sumed damage rule makes defamation an oddity of tort law. Tres-
pass law permits presumed damages, for example, but the modern
rule seems to be that the plaintiff may recover only nominal dam-
ages unless he proves that the trespass caused actual harm.' The
4. McCormick, The Measure of Damages for Defamation, 12 N.C.L. Rav. 120, 127 (1934).
5. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 621 comment a (1976); see also W. PROS-
SER, supra note 1, § 112, at 761.
6. 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974).
7. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 163 comment e (1976); W. PROSSER, supra note
1, § 13, at 66.
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same is true of most constitutional torts. Courts also have em-
ployed something similar to the presumption of harm in cases in-
volving the unconstitutional denial of the right to vote.8 The
United States Supreme Court, however, has refused to adopt a
general rule presuming harm in civil rights cases.9 Thus, a plaintiff
who is deprived of procedural due process is entitled only to nomi-
nal damages unless he proves that he has suffered actual injury.1°
In contrast, the presumed damages in defamation cases are not
limited to nominal sums, and awards are often substantial.
The thesis of this Article is that compensating individuals for
actual harm to reputation is the only legitimate purpose of defa-
mation law today. Proof of such harm, therefore, should be re-
quired in every libel or slander case. By actual harm, I mean prov-
able injury to reputation. Nonpecuniary reputational losses would
qualify, but mental anguish alone would not.
II. CONSEQUENCES OF PRESUMING HARM
A number of evils flow from the anomaly of presumed damages.
First, although labelled "compensatory," recovery is not limited to
compensation. Juries usually are instructed that their awards of
presumed damages must be commensurate with the actual injuries
sustained.11 Giving a jury guidance as to what that amount should
be is impossible, however, because the law provides no criteria.
Judges cannot give meaningful instructions when the substantive
law concedes that "[there is no legal measure of damages in ac-
tions for these wrongs. The amount which the injured party ought
to recover is referred to the sound discretion of the jury. ' 12 As a
result, the process of fixing an amount of presumed damages is in-
8. See Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Giles
v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903).
9. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (rejecting the argument that harm should be
presumed by analogy to defamation).
10. Id. For criticism of this result, see Note, Damage Awards for Constitutional Torts: A
Reconsideration after Carey v. Piphus, 93 HAv. L. REv. 966 (1980).
11. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), for example, the trial judge
had given this written instruction: "I charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that compensatory
damages, if awarded at all, must be fixed at such a figure as the jury dispassionately and
according to the evidence in this case finds to be commensurate with the injury actually
sustained by the plaintiff." Petition for certiorari at 98.
12. 4 J. SuTHERLAND, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF DAMAGES § 1206 (4th ed. 1916).
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herently irrational. As McCormick said, "damages in defamation
cases are measurable by no standard which different men can use
with like results."13
Second, in the absence of comprehensible criteria, juries may be
tempted to consider impermissible factors, such as the defendant's
wealth or unpopularity. "[T]he doctrine of presumed damages in-
vites juries to punish unpopular opinion rather than to compensate
individuals for injury sustained by the publication of a false
fact.' 1 4 In this respect, presumed damages may be more pernicious
than punitive damages. The latter at least are recognized as being
noncompensatory and are recoverable in most states only upon a
showing of egregious behavior by the defendant. Moreover, by vir-
tue of being segregated from the rest of the damage award, puni-
tive damages can be supervised by trial and appellate courts. In
contrast, punishment in the guise of presumed compensatory dam-
ages is entirely subterranean and, therefore, difficult to identify
and control.
Third, courts have created convoluted theories to avoid the doc-
trine of presumed harm. "Courts are totally accustomed to the oth-
erwise universal rule that one of the plaintiff's burdens is the obli-
gation to show that he was hurt by what the defendant did. The
judges instinctively shy away from the idea of any substantial
award unsupported by evidence."'15 Consequently, for centuries,
judges have invented ways to avoid the presumed damage rule. An
obvious-and odious-example is the doctrine of libel per quod.
This doctrine serves only one purpose: to prevent the award of pre-
sumed damages. In states that recognize this Gothic doctrine 6 , a
plaintiff must prove special damage unless the statement at issue is
libelous per se.
The legitimacy of the libel per quod doctrine was the subject of
the famous debate between Dean Prosser and Laurence Eldredge.
Eldredge argued that harm was presumed in all libel cases. 17 Pros-
ser argued that harm was presumed only if the publication was
13. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 120 (1935).
14. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349.
15. Murnaghan, From Figment to Fiction to Philosophy-The Requirement of Proof of
Damages in Libel Actions, 22 CATH. U.L. REv. 1, 27 (1972) (footnote omitted).
16. See R. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 346 (1980).
17. Eldredge, The Spurious Rule of Libel Per Quod, 79 HARV. L. REv. 733 (1966).
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libelous on its face or fell into one of the categories of slander per
se.18 Francis Murnaghan's observation about the debate was cor-
rect: in the heat of battle, both Prosser and Eldredge failed to see
that the real problem was the presumed harm doctrine itself, and
that the controversy over the role of libel per quod was only a
symptom of judicial hostility to the underlying presumption. 9
The doctrine of slander per se is another judicial contortion. To
limit the action for slander, courts label certain categories of
speech as "slander per se." Courts presume that statements within
these categories cause harm. Other slanders are actionable only
upon proof of special harm. 0 Indeed, the distinction between libel
and slander, which makes little sense in an era when spoken defa-
mation can reach millions via the electronic media, would be
meaningless except that presumed damages are the rule in libel
cases and the exception in slander cases.
Fourth, the doctrine of presumed harm forces us to begin the
analysis of every defamation case with an abstraction: are the
words used the kind that would tend to harm reputation? Whether
the defendant's words actually did harm the plaintiff's reputation
is not controlling. Thus, we must speculate about whether the al-
legedly libelous statement is of a kind that would tend to harm
reputation. "To be defamatory, it is not necessary that the commu-
nication actually cause harm to another's reputation or deter third
persons from associating or dealing with him. Its character de-
pends upon its general tendency to have such an effect."2 1 Like
most abstractions, this leads to higher levels of abstraction, such as
whether the segment of the community that would find the state-
ment defamatory constitutes a "respectable" or "right-thinking"
minority.22
Once a court starts down a path that has nothing to do with the
facts of the case, further excursions are inevitable. Some courts, for
example, ask whether the statement was capable of an innocent
meaning. If it was, those courts hold the statement not actionable,
18. Prosser, More Libel Per Quod, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1629, 1630 (1966).
19. Murnaghan, supra note 15, at 7.
20. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF ToRTS §§ 570-574 (1976).
21. Id. § 559 comment d.
22. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 559 comment e (1976); W. PRossER, supra
note 1, § 111, at 743-44.
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no matter how the statement actually was understood. 3 On the
theory that everyone makes an occasional mistake, other courts ar-
bitrarily assume that a statement asserting a single act of miscon-
duct or negligence by a business or professional person is not
defamatory. 4
Abolishing the presumption of harm would not eliminate all of
these problems. Courts still would have to determine whether a
statement is defamatory. Otherwise, defamation would be sub-
sumed entirely by the tort of injurious falsehood, and good reasons
probably exist for maintaining the separate torts. 5 But beginning
the inquiry with the usual tort question, whether the plaintiff has
been harmed by the defendant's conduct, at least would have the
virtue of focusing attention on the facts of the case.
Fifth, the presumed harm doctrine diminishes judges' control
over the size of jury verdicts. With no criteria by which different
people can reach similar results, and no legal measure of dam-
ages," courts have difficulty finding that a particular award is ex-
cessive. Courts can do little more than articulate some reformula-
tion of Chancellor Kent's classic dictum:
The damages ... must be so excessive as to strike mankind, at
first blush, as being beyond all measure, unreasonable and out-
rageous, and such as manifestly show the jury to have been actu-
ated by passion, partiality, prejudice, or corruption. In short, the
damages must be flagrantly outrageous and extravagant, or the
court cannot undertake to draw the line; for they have no stan-
dard by which to ascertain the excess."'
Remittitur, the device by which courts normally control excessive
verdicts, "is palpably a very inexact control since the judges them-
selves are without any measuring stick for determining whether a
23. See, e.g., Chapski v. Copley Press, 92 Ill. 2d 344, 442 N.E.2d 195 (1982); Walker v.
Kansas City Star Co., 406 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. 1966).
24. See, e.g., Twiggar v. Ossining Printing & Publishing Co., 161 A.D. 718, 146 N.Y.S. 529
(1914), appeal dismissed, 220 N.Y. 716, 116 N.E. 1080 (1917).
25. Actions for injurious falsehood typically impose on plaintiffs burdens that are even
greater than the burdens that defamation plaintiffs bear, such as the burden of proving that
the defendant's conduct was not privileged. See Prosser, Injurious Fasehood. The Basis of
Liability, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 425 (1959).
26. See supra text accompanying notes 11-13.
27. Coleman v. Southwick, 9 Johns. 44, 52 (N.Y. 1812).
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verdict is excessive where the rule is that the plaintiff need not
introduce evidence of the harm he has suffered. '28
Sixth, the enterprise of compensating a loss that may not have
occurred has generated some mystifying rules of evidence. The pre-
sumption of harm is not the only source of questionable rules of
evidence, of course, but it does seem to foster them. Some courts,
for example, have treated the presumption of harm as conclusive,
giving the plaintiff a cause of action even if the defendant proves
that the plaintiff has suffered no harm; the defendant's evidence is
admissible only in mitigation.2 9 Thus, proof that no one believed
the defamatory statement would not destroy the cause of action."
This conclusive presumption had a corollary: because harm to
the plaintiff was presumed, courts also assumed that the plaintiff
had a good reputation before the defamation. Unless the defendant
attacked the presumption by offering to show that the plaintiff's
reputation was bad, the plaintiff was not allowed to show that his
reputation was good.31 Amazingly, courts disagreed about whether
a plaintiff could show that the defamation had caused his friends
and family to shun him. Some courts rejected this testimony on
the ground that the jury could judge the likely effect of the defa-
mation from the nature of the accusation.3 2 Other courts held that
the plaintiff was not compelled to rely on the presumption of
harm, but could give direct proof of the effects of the defamation.3
Most of this nonsense is probably obsolete now. In several recent
28. Murnaghan, supra note 15, at 29 n.100. See also Note, Libel and the Corporate
Plaintiff, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1496, 1510 (1969) ("[Piresumptive damages have permitted
juries to make outrageous awards, against which remittitur is but an ineffective check.").
29. See, e.g., Stidham v. Wachtel, 41 Del. 327, 21 A.2d 282 (1941); Murnaghan, supra note
15, at 13; Developments in the Law-Defamation, 69 HARv. L. REv. 875, 887 (1956) [herein-
after cited as Developments].
30. See, e.g., Dall v. Time, Inc., 252 A.D. 636, 300 N.Y.S. 680 (1937); Developments, supra
note 29, at 883.
31. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Mayoras, 175 Mich. 582, 141 N.W. 662 (1913); McCormick, supra
note 4, at 130. There were at least two exceptions to this corollary. If the defamation related
to the plaintiff's business or profession, he was allowed to show that his business or profes-
sional reputation was good. See, e.g., Draper v. Hellman Commercial Trust & Say. Bank,
203 Cal. 26, 263 P. 240 (1948). Moreover, the plaintiff in all cases could prove his general
social and financial status. See, e.g., Bingham v. Gaynor, 135 A.D. 426, 119 N.Y.S. 1010
(1909); see also McCormick, supra note 4, at 129-30.
32. See, e.g., Sheftall v. Central of Ga. Ry., 123 Ga. 589, 51 S.E. 646 (1905).
33. See McCormick, supra note 4, at 133 n.50.
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decisions, courts have held that the plaintiff had no cause of ac-
tion, even for statements defamatory on their face, because the
plaintiff's reputation was so bad that it could not be harmed fur-
ther. On this ground, courts rejected libel claims by an habitual
criminal 4 and by the convicted murderer of Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr. 5 These courts obviously are not treating the presumption
of harm as conclusive. Professor Dobbs states that a plaintiff now
may prove his good reputation," and that the plaintiff's evidence
that the statement seemed to cause his associates to shun him is
no longer excludable on the ground that those facts are
presumed. 7
At least two other evidentiary marvels, however, remain intact.
One rule precludes a defendant from showing that the libel was
already in circulation.88 Logically, this evidence should be admissi-
ble in mitigation to show that the defendant did not cause all of
the plaintiff's damage. The evidence apparently continues to be ex-
cluded, however, on the theory that segregating the harm from dif-
ferent sources is too difficult. The other rule is that evidence of the
defendant's good faith is admissible in mitigation."9 How the de-
fendant's motivation could affect the amount of the plaintiff's
damage is unclear. Perhaps the rule is a tacit admission that pre-
sumed damages actually may be awarded to punish the
defendant.0
34. Cardillo v. Doubleday & Co., 518 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1975).
35. Ray v. Time, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 618 (W.D. Tenn. 1976), aff'd mem., 582 F.2d 1280 (6th
Cir. 1978); see also Turner v. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1437
(W.D. Ky. 1979); Logan v. District of Columbia, 447 F. Supp. 1328 (D.D.C. 1978).
36. D. Dons, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 516 (1973).
37. Id. at 515.
38. See, e.g., Gray v. Brooklyn Union Publishing Co., 35 A.D. 286, 55 N.Y.S. 35 (1898). In
Gray, the plaintiff was accused of having bought another woman's husband for $25. The
defendant sought to introduce evidence that the same accusation had been published in
other New York newspapers. The Appellate Division held that the evidence was not admis-
sible for any purpose. See generally D. DoBS, supra note 36, at 517. But see Hartmann v.
American News Co., 171 F.2d 581, 585 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907 (1949);
Dacey v. Connecticut Bar Ass'n, 170 Conn. 520, 533-34, 368 A.2d 125, 132-33 (1976); Warren
v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 336 Mo. 184, 212, 78 S.W.2d 404, 420 (1934); Holway v. World
Publishing Co., 171 Okla. 306, 312-13, 44 P.2d 881, 889 (1935).
39. See Conroy v. Fall River Herald News Co., 306 Mass. 488, 28 N.E.2d 729 (1940); see
also R. SACK, supra note 16, at 360.
40. A line of Michigan cases blurs the distinction between compensatory and punitive
damages by stating that "only exemplary damages which are compensatory in nature are
754 [Vol. 25:747
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Finally, presumed harm permits recoveries that are not necessa-
rily related to the legitimate interests of defamation law. According
to Justice Harlan, "the legitimate function of libel law must be un-
derstood as that of compensating individuals for actual, measura-
ble harm caused by the conduct of others."41 The doctrine of pre-
sumed harm misses the mark in two ways. First, the doctrine
permits recovery when no injury to reputation has occurred. Sec-
ond, when injury to reputation has occurred, the doctrine permits
awards unrelated to the magnitude of the injury.
Some of the most celebrated defamation cases involved plaintiffs
who won substantial awards even though they probably suffered no
significant injury to reputation. The plaintiff in New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan,42 for example, was a segregationist politician in Al-
abama in the early 1960's who was awarded $500,000 for a publica-
tion that had accused him of violating the civil rights of black and
northern demonstrators. As Justice Black observed, "this record
lends support to an inference that instead of being damaged Com-
missioner Sullivan's political, social, and financial prestige has
likely been enhanced by the Times' publication."'43 Elmer Gertz
won $100,000 in compensatory damages and $300,000 in punitive
damages for the John Birch Society's publication of charges that
he was a "Leninist" and "Communist-fronter" with a criminal re-
cord.44 Gertz, a prominent civil liberties lawyer, might have been
harmed more if the Birch Society had praised him. Nevertheless,
the court awarded damages despite Gertz's failure to show that his
reputation as a lawyer had been tarnished.
The first amendment implications of potentially substantial
awards to individuals whose reputations have not been injured are
serious.
The largely uncontrolled discretion of juries to award damages
allowable." Ray v. City of Detroit, 67 Mich. App. 702, 704, 242 N.W.2d 494, 495 (1976). See
also Long v. Tribune Printing Co., 107 Mich. 207, 65 N.W. 108 (1895); Pettengill v. Booth
Newspapers, 88 Mich. App. 587, 278 N.W.2d 682 (1979). These cases suggest that the egre-
giousness of the defendant's conduct is relevant to the plaintiff's award for mental anguish.
41. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 66 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
42. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
43. Id. at 294 (Black, J., concurring).
44. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 680 F.2d 527, 531 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
1233 (1983).
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where there is no loss unnecessarily compounds the potential of
any system of liability for defamatory falsehood to inhibit the
vigorous exercise of First Amendment freedoms. Additionally,
the doctrine of presumed damages invites juries to punish un-
popular opinion rather than to compensate individuals for injury
sustained by the publication of a false fact. More to the point,
the States have no substantial interest in securing for plaintiffs
such as this petitioner gratuitous awards of money damages far
in excess of any actual injury.45
III. ACTUAL INJURY
The Supreme Court's answer to the anomaly of presumed dam-
ages was to "restrict defamation plaintiffs who do not prove knowl-
edge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth to compensation
for actual injury. ' 46 The solution has not worked for two reasons.
First, the Court prohibited presumed damages only when liability
was based on something less than reckless disregard. As a result,
presumed damages remain available for public officials and public
figures-who always must prove reckless disregard 7-and for any
private plaintiff able to meet the reckless disregard test. Meeting
that test may not be as difficult as we once assumed. For example,
after going to the Supreme Court to avoid having to prove reckless
disregard, Elmer Gertz met the test on remand in order to qualify
for presumed and punitive damages.4
Second, the Court's solution failed because the Court defined
"actual injury" to include not only impairment of reputation, but
also "personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering. '
Thus, a plaintiff who cannot prove harm to his reputation still can
recover damages if he can prove mental anguish. The expansive-
ness of this actual injury standard was compounded by the Court's
statement that "there need be no evidence which assigns an actual
dollar value to the injury. "50 The actual injury requirement of
Gertz still would have been useful if the Court had interpreted the
45. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 342-43.
48. 680 F.2d at 531-34.
49. 418 U.S. at 350.
50. Id.
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requirement as allowing damages for mental anguish only parasiti-
cally." The logic of Gertz-that only the states' substantial inter-
est in protecting reputation could justify the speech-inhibiting ef-
fects of libel law-suggested that interpretation.
At the first opportunity, however, the Court explained that ac-
tual injury could mean emotional injury alone. In Time, Inc. v.
Firestone,5 2 the plaintiff withdrew her claim for harm to reputa-
tion before trial. The defendant then argued that the actual injury
requirement precluded recovery. The Court rejected the argument
summarily, stating:
Florida has obviously decided to permit recovery for other inju-
ries without regard to measuring the effect the falsehood may
have had upon a plaintiff's reputation. This does not transform
the action into something other than an action for defamation as
that term is meant in Gertz. In that opinion we made it clear
that States could base awards on elements other than injury to
reputation, specifically listing "personal humiliation, and mental
anguish and suffering" as examples of injuries which might be
compensated consistently with the Constitution upon a showing
of fault.3
Mrs. Firestone had produced evidence that the publication made
her anxious and concerned, and that she feared her young son
might be affected adversely by the defamatory falsehood when he
grew older. Her $100,000 verdict, therefore, was compatible with
the Court's actual injury requirement."
That requirement, as defined in Gertz and interpreted in Fire-
stone, is not a significant obstacle to recovering damages. Any
plaintiff who can persuade a jury that a defamation caused him
anguish apparently can satisfy the standard. Indeed, as Professor
Ashdown has commented,5 5 the net effect of Gertz and Firestone
may have been to increase, rather than decrease, the likelihood of
gratuitous awards of compensatory damages. The Court's actual
51. See infra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
52. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
53. Id. at 460.
54. See id. at 461. Florida continues to adhere to this view of actual injury. See Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Ane, 423 So. 2d 376 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
55. Ashdown, Gertz and Firestone: A Study in Constitutional Policy-Making, 61 MINN.
L. RE v. 645, 670-71 (1977).
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injury standard is an invitation to the states to convert the tort of
defamation from its common law purpose of protecting reputation
into a new remedy for mental distress. 56 Obviously, Gertz did not
eliminate the presumed harm problem.
The solution is to abolish the doctrine of presumed harm. Like
other tort actions, defamation actions should require competent
proof of injury. The plaintiff should be required to demonstrate
harm to reputation. Once actual harm to reputation is shown, the
states should be free to award damages for emotional injuries, such
as humiliation and mental anguish, just as they do when a physical
injury has been proved. If a plaintiff suffers no demonstrable harm
to his reputation, however, he should have no cause of action for
defamation. The jury should be required to separate its award for
harm to reputation from its award for emotional injury. Trial
courts should strike any award that is not supported by competent
evidence.
Rules requiring proof of harm to reputation already have been
adopted in New York, Kansas, and Arkansas, at least in private
plaintiff cases.57 The Kansas Supreme Court, after reviewing the
common law basis for defamation, said that
damage to one's reputation is the essence and gravamen of an
action for defamation. Unless injury to reputation is shown,
plaintiff has not established a valid claim for defamation, by ei-
ther libel or slander, under our law.
... We agree with the New York rule that the plaintiff in an
action for defamation must first offer proof of harm to reputa-
tion; any claim for mental anguish is "parasitic," and compensa-
ble only after damage to reputation has been established. 8
The Arkansas Supreme Court reached the same result on first
amendment grounds:
The law of defamation has always attempted to balance the ten-
sion between the individual's right to protect his reputation and
56. Id.
57. See Little Rock Newspapers v. Dodrill, 281 Ark. 25, 660 S.W.2d 936 (1983); Gobin v.
Globe Publishing Co., 232 Kan. 1, 649 P.2d 1239 (1982); France v. St. Clare's Hosp. &
Health Center, 82 A.D.2d 1, 441 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1981); Salomone v. MacMillan Publishing Co.,
77 A.D.2d 501, 429 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1980).
58. 232 Kan. at 6-7, 649 P.2d at 1243-44.
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the right of free speech. To totally change the character of defa-
mation to allow recovery when there has been no loss of the for-
mer right, would be an unjustified infringement on the First
Amendment."9
I am not suggesting a return to the common law notion of special
damages. Special harm is sometimes viewed as the alternative to
presumed harm, but it is not. As it has evolved in defamation law,
the doctrine of special harm is as crabbed as the doctrine of pre-
sumed harm is expansive.
The doctrine of special harm is the descendant of the temporal
harm concept that the common law courts used in the sixteenth
century to wrest jurisdiction from the ecclesiastical courts in some
slander cases. When the common law judges discovered that there
was more slander in the world than they had bargained for, they
turned the harm requirement around and used it to screen out
cases by holding that the plaintiff had failed to plead or prove the
requisite kind of harm.e0
Modern definitions of special harm usually sound fairly sensible.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts, for example, describes special
harm as "the loss of something having economic or pecuniary
value." 61 As actually applied, however, the special harm idea has
been anything but sensible. Courts have rejected evidence that the
plaintiff has suffered physical illness, 2 that friends and associates
59. 281 Ark. at -, 660 S.W.2d at 936.
In Hearst Corp. v. Hughes, 297 Md. 112, 466 A.2d 486 (1983), the Maryland Court of
Appeals reached the opposite conclusion, accepting the Florida position that emotional dis-
tress alone is enough to justify recovery. The majority advanced the reasons typically of-
fered in defense of presumed damage: harm to reputation is difficult to prove, and the infer-
ence that publication of a defamatory statement is likely to cause anguish is reasonable. Id.
at 129-30, 466 A.2d at 495. The majority observed that the Restatement (Second) of Torts
and other authorities still permit awards of nominal damages without proof of harm to rep-
utation, and concluded that awards for proven mental distress a fortiori would be appropri-
ate. Id. at 128, 466 A.2d at 494. In dissent, Judge Davidson noted that the only real author-
ity for the majority's premise was the Restatement, and that another section of the
Restatement expresses doubt about whether nominal damages are recoverable under Gertz
without proof of harm to reputation. Id. at 138, 466 A.2d at 499 (Davidson, J., dissenting).
See also International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 1805 v. Mayo, 281 Md. 475, 379 A.2d
1223 (1977).
60. See Veeder, History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 COLUM. L. REv. 546,
555-58 (1903).
61. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 575 comment b (1976).
62. See, e.g., Scott v. Harrison, 215 N.C. 427, 2 S.E.2d 1 (1939).
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have been alienated, and that the plaintiff has been turned out of
her home by her husband."3 In one recent case, a plaintiff who
proved that his wife left him because of the alleged defamation not
only failed to show special damages, but actually proved his oppo-
nent's argument for summary judgment. Because the plaintiff's ev-
idence showed that his wife was a net financial burden, the court
held as a matter of law that the plaintiff had suffered no special
harm.64
Professor Ashdown has urged that all recoveries be limited by
the common law special damage rule. 5 If that rule meant simply
"pecuniary loss," as he suggests, I would agree. Because "special
damage" has acquired its own peculiar meaning, however, I believe
that term should be discarded and the new term, "actual injury,"
should be used.
This proposal, although consistent with Gertz, is inconsistent
with Firestone. Under an actual injury standard, the court would
have dismissed Mrs. Firestone's case when she waived any claim of
harm to reputation.6 As a general proposition, a state should be
free to compensate nonreputational injuries and to call the cause
of action by any name it chooses. Firestone, of course, does not
require the states to allow recoveries for purely emotional injuries
in defamation actions; it merely holds that the constitution does
not prohibit them from doing so. As a matter of tort law, therefore,
my proposal is not inconsistent with Firestone. For several reasons,
however, I go further: as a matter of constitutional law, the states
should not be allowed to recognize a cause of action for mental
suffering under the guise of defamation.
First, most states already have several bodies of law that com-
pensate persons for mental suffering. Most notable are the tort ac-
tions of assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Each of these actions has its own requirements and restrictions.
Both require more than mere negligence and are limited to distress
caused by certain egregious behavior, such as an act creating an
imminent apprehension of harm or "extreme and outrageous con-
63. See McCormick, supra note 4, at 124-25.
64. Sauerhoff v. Hearst Corp., 388 F. Supp. 117, 122-25 (D. Md. 1974), vacated on other
grounds, 538 F.2d 588 (4th Cir. 1976).
65. Ashdown, supra note 56, at 670.
66. See supra text accompanying notes 52-55.
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duct. '6 7 Those limitations presumably reflect a judgment about the
types of mental distress that the law should compensate.68 To
make the same injuries compensable under the rules of defamation
circumvents the rules developed for these other tort actions and
abandons their underlying policies.
Of course, the law often permits under one name what it prohib-
its under another. Whether this is desirable ordinarily is not a
matter of constitutional concern. In defamation cases, however,
courts must look behind the label because not every state interest
justifies the same level of interference with first amendment free-
doms. Gertz began with the proposition that the common law rules
of defamation permitted unconstitutional infringements of free-
dom of speech and the press.6 9 The Court could have forbidden the
states from imposing liability, but declined to do so "in recognition
of the strong and legitimate state interest in compensating private
individuals for injury to reputation. 7 0 The Court reached the ac-
commodation chosen in Gertz only after an extended discussion of
the importance of reputation and of the various ways in which the
reputational interests of private persons may differ from those of
public officials and public figures.7 1 Gertz thus represents a judg-
ment about the appropriate balance to be struck between first
amendment and reputational interests.
The same balance would not necessarily be appropriate if the
state interest were mental distress, rather than reputation. 2 States
undoubtedly may adopt tort rules designed to protect nonreputa-
tional interests." When those interests are weighed against first
amendment interests, however, they should be required to stand
on their own merits rather than masquerade as reputational
interests.
67. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 21, 46 (1965).
68. See Hearst Corp. v. Hughes, 297 Md. 112, 145-46, 466 A.2d 486, 502-03 (1983) (David-
son, J., dissenting).
69. See 418 U.S. at 340.
70. Id. at 348-49.
71. See id. at 342-45.
72. Cf. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (the state's interest in pro-
tecting a plaintiff's privacy could not justify imposing liability for the truthful publication of
information from public judicial records).
73. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
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Negligent infliction of mental distress by publishing a falsehood
may well be a tort, but it is not the tort of defamation. Defama-
tion is injury to reputation. If the essence of the law of defama-
tion is to be preserved in the wake of the Court's destruction of
the conclusive presumption of injury, a defamation plaintiff
must first prove impairment of reputation before he is entitled
to recover for personal humiliation and mental anguish and
suffering.7
Second, treating emotional injuries as parasitic helps to ensure
that an injury exists. Tort law historically has refused to compen-
sate emotional injuries alone, in part because of the inability to
determine objectively whether the injuries have occurred.7 5 Al-
lowing recovery for pain and suffering or for fright only after proof
of some tangible injury is a means, however imperfect, of separat-
ing the injured from the merely greedy. Although the exceptions
may be about to swallow this rule," tort law still exhibits consider-
able uneasiness about compensating purely emotional injuries. 77
Third, emotional injuries always have been regarded as parasitic
to the defamation claim. Prosser noted that "[d]efamation is not
concerned with the plaintiff's own humiliation, wrath or sorrow,
except as an element of 'parasitic' damages attached to an inde-
pendent cause of action. '7 8 The Restatement (Second) of Torts
maintains that liability for emotional distress exists only if the
plaintiff would have an independent claim for harm to reputa-
tion.7 9 The Restatement view assumes the availability of the pre-
sumed harm doctrine, allowing the plaintiff to receive damages for
emotional injury automatically in per se cases, but the insistence
that the claim depends on the existence of harm to reputation is
clear. The New York Court of Appeals explained the reason for
74. Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and
Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REv. 1349, 1438-39 (1975) (footnotes omitted).
75. See Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 100 (1959). Even in an intentional tort, the plaintiff must
prove substantial other damages before the court may award damages for emotional dis-
tress. See, e.g., Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675, 694, 271 N.W.2d 368, 378
(1978).
76. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
77. See, e.g., Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 210 S.E.2d 145 (1974) (requiring clear and
convincing proof of the emotional injury).
78. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 111, at 737.
79. REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 623 comment a, illustration 1 (1976).
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this rule over a century ago:
It would be highly impolitic to hold all language, wounding the
feelings and affecting unfavorably the health and ability to la-
bor, of another, a ground of action; for that would be to make
the right of action depend often upon whether the sensibilities
of a person spoken of are easily excited or otherwise; his
strength of mind to disregard abusive, insulting remarks con-
cerning him; and his physical strength and ability to bear
them.80
Fourth, allowing recovery for mental anguish alone would make
the actual injury requirement ineffectual. A defamation plaintiff
always can argue that the statement caused him anguish. A rule
that requires actual injury, but allows the plaintiff to satisfy it by
showing emotional harm alone, does nothing more than prescribe a
litany for the plaintiff to recite. Such a rule would give the courts
little power to weed out undeserving claims. Thus, however theo-
retically desirable recovery for mental distress alone might be,
pragmatism counsels against it.
Some contend that damages should never be recoverable for
mental anguish. Anthony Lewis, for example, argues that permit-
ting recovery for mental anguish "would allow juries to speculate
at large and in effect bring back presumed damages." '81 Permitting
recovery for mental anguish certainly allows juries to speculate,
and makes controlling the size of verdicts more difficult, but it
does not bring back presumed damages. The central vice of the
presumed damage doctrine is that it permits recovery without
proof of any injury. My proposal requires proof of some harm to
reputation in every case. Thus, even if the proposal failed to con-
trol the size of verdicts, it still would serve an important function
by screening out cases in which no proof of any injury to reputa-
tion exists. I believe it also would help to control the size of ver-
dicts, however, by requiring the judge and jury to focus their atten-
tion on the affects of the defamation. If experience proves that
80. Terwilliger v. Wands, 17 N.Y. 54, 60 (1858). Contra Modisette & Adams v. Lorenze,
163 La. 505, 112 So. 397 (1927) (affirming $500 libel award to plaintiff whose reputation was
not injured, but who suffered humiliation and outrage).
81. Lewis, New York Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered: Time to Return to "The Central
Meaning of the First Amendment," 83 COLUM. L. REv. 603, 615 (1983).
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even parasitic awards for mental suffering produce excessive ver-
dicts, then it will be time to prohibit them altogether.
IV. PROVING HARM
The usual justification for presumed damages is that "damage to
reputation is recurringly difficult to prove."8 As Prosser said,
"proof of actual damage will be impossible in a great many cases
where, from the character of the defamatory words and the cir-
cumstances of publication, it is all but certain that serious harm
has resulted in fact."83 If judges believe there are many cases of
serious but unproveable harm to reputation, they are not likely to
abandon the presumed harm rule. The remainder of this Article,
therefore, explores the difficulties of proving harm to reputation.
The presumed harm doctrine obscures three different sets of
problems. The first involve difficulties in proving that harm to rep-
utation has occurred; the second involve difficulties in quantifying
the loss. Although not mutually exclusive, these categories are not
identical. The quantification problems tend to be similar to the
difficulties encountered throughout tort law when courts seek to
place a monetary value on a nonpecuniary injury. Estimating the
impact of a defamatory statement probably is not inherently more
difficult than placing a value on a loss of consortium. But problems
related to the existence of injury tend to be peculiar to defamation,
or at least to the nonphysical torts. Determining whether a plain-
tiff has been harmed by the imputation of racist actions, for exam-
ple, is not a process that finds ready analogies in other areas of the
law.
The third set of problems is related to causation. The presumed
harm rule is also a presumed causation rule. The rule relieves the
plaintiff not only of the need to prove his injury and the extent of
his damages, but also of the need to show that his harm was
caused by the defendant. The presumption of causation was so
strong at common law that it not only relieved the plaintiff of the
need to establish causation and to negate the existence of other
82. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 394 (White, J., dissenting).
83. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 112, at 765. See also 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMEs, THE LAW
OF TORTS § 5.30, at 468 (1956) ("Libel and slander work their evil in ways that are invidious
and subtle.").
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possible causes of injury, but it even prevented the defendant from
introducing evidence of alternative theories of causation. This fact
is clear from the rule that a defendant was precluded from showing
that a defamatory falsehood was already in circulation.84 If the
presumed damage doctrine is abolished, new problems of causation
will arise.8 5
The presumed harm doctrine obscures several different types of
harm. I have already identified two broad categories: the relational
injuries-that is, harm to reputation; and the internal injuries,
such as mental distress and humiliation. The relational injuries in-
clude at least four distinct types of reputational harm. First, the
defamation may interfere with the plaintiff's existing relations
with third persons. If his family ostracizes him, his friends shun
him, his acquaintances ridicule him, his employer fires him, or his
customers desert him, he has suffered an injury to existing social,
business, or family relations.
Second, the plaintiff may suffer an interference with future rela-
tions. The plaintiff's friends, family, and business associates may
stand by him, but people who do not know him may be less skepti-
cal of the defamation and may decide not to associate with him.
This plaintiff loses the benefit of future business and social
relationships.
Third, the defamation may destroy a favorable public image.
The first two types of harm are true relational injuries,86 resulting
from damage to actual human relationships. The third type of in-
jury, however, occurs despite the absence of any relationship. It is
easiest to see in public figure cases.
In the case of General William Westmoreland, s7 for example, the
84. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
85. See infra text accompanying notes 101-103.
86. The concept of relational injuries, distinct from injuries to property and person, was
one of the most important analytical advances in tort law in this century. It was the creation
of my beloved teacher and friend, the late Dean Leon Green. See, e.g., Green, Relational
Interests, 29 ILL. L. REv. 460 (1934); Green, The Right to Communicate, 35 N.Y.U. L. Rv.
903 (1960).
87. General Westmoreland, commander of the U.S. Army in Vietnam, is suing CBS over a
1982 documentary entitled "The Uncounted Enemy- A Vietnam Deception." He contends
that the film libelously accused him of conspiring to misrepresent the strength of enemy
forces. The case has not come to trial, and only preliminary skirmishes have reached the
official reports. See Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 10 MEiA L. REP. (BNA) 1215 (S.D.N.Y.
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publication that he considers defamatory may or may not harm his
existing or future relations. His friends, family, military associates,
and other personal acquaintances probably will not change their
attitudes toward him because of the alleged defamation. Due to his
age and retirement from the military, Westmoreland probably
would not have developed as many new personal relationships as a
younger person would, even without the alleged defamation. Even
if he does not suffer any signficant harm to existing or future per-
sonal relationships, however, Westmoreland may suffer harm to his
public image. To a person of Westmoreland's station in life, his
place in history may be as important to him as his personal rela-
tionships. He has spent a lifetime cultivating a positive image as a
brave soldier and trustworthy leader. This image has little to do
with actual personal relationships. It rests primarily on the image
of him that the mass media have created in the public mind. Pub-
lic image bears little relation to the interests envisioned by the
courts when defamation law was evolving. In that era, reputation
represented the esteem a person earned, through the daily conduct
of his affairs, in the eyes of those who knew him; the public image
interest is a creature of mass communications.
Nonetheless, public image is a valuable asset. A favorable public
image enables a public figure to earn large fees for lecturing or for
endorsing products. It is a source of influence in politics, entertain-
ment, sports, religion, education, or other fields. It may be an im-
portant source of self-esteem and personal satisfaction. A person
who enjoys a positive public image thus may be injured by defama-
tion, even if there is no harm to his existing or future personal
relations.
Fourth, defamation can cause harm by creating a negative public
image for a person who previously had no public image at all.88
This injury probably is rare because harm will occur only when the
defamation is so memorable that the statement has a lasting im-
pact on people who do not know the plaintiff. This injury would
1984); Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 97 F.R.D. 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
88. Cf. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 104 S. Ct. 1473, 1479 (1984) ("The reputation of the
libel victim may suffer harm even in a state in which he has hitherto been anonymous. The
communication of the libel may create a negative reputation among the residents of a juris-
diction where the plaintiff's previous reputation was, however small, at least unblemished."
(footnote omitted)).
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occur, for example, if an ordinary person, without a public image,
were accused of an act so heinous that both the accusation and the
identity of the accused stayed in the public mind. Assume, for ex-
ample, that Lee Harvey Oswald did not kill John Kennedy, but
was accused of having done so. Before the accusation was pub-
lished, Oswald was an anonymous' private person with no signifi-
cant public image. The act of which he was accused, however, was
so notorious that it not only would destroy existing and future re-
lations, but also would create a lasting negative impression of Os-
wald in the public mind. The creation of a negative public image,
therefore, probably should be treated as an independent loss. Just
as General Westmoreland's positive public image is a valuable as-
set, so is Oswald's negative public image a financial and psycholog-
ical liability.
These are four different types of harm to reputation, and there
may be more. My proposal would require a plaintiff to prove one of
these types of reputational harm as a prerequisite to recovery. If a
plaintiff really has been injured, he should be able to produce evi-
dence of at least one of these species of injury.
The plaintiff can prove anything that would constitute special
damage under the common law. Loss of a specific job, contract, or
client is demonstrable pecuniary loss that courts accept under even
the narrowest definitions of special harm. The concept of actual
injury, however, includes other types of demonstrable harm to ex-
isting relations that the special damage rule excludes, such as de-
sertion by a spouse, the estrangement of a child or parent, loss of
friends, or any other deterioration of an existing relationship. The
relationship need not have a pecuniary value; proof that any ex-
isting relationship has been seriously disrupted should suffice.
Nor is it necessary to prove that the relationship was destroyed.
Defamation often does its harm by sowing seeds of doubt, rather
than by completely destroying relationships. A plaintiff's associates
should be allowed to testify that doubts have been planted in their
minds even though they did not believe the defamation entirely
and have not terminated relations with the plaintiff.8 9 Rules of evi-
89. My colleague, David Robertson, suggests the danger of a self-fulfilling prophecy here.
He fears that the act of testifying under oath about doubts and suspicions concerning the
plaintiff may create, deepen, or solidify those doubts. This is possible, but I do not believe it
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dence should not reject the common assumption that where there
is smoke, there is likely to be fire.
One justification offered for the presumption of harm is the be-
lief that the plaintiff's witnesses will be reluctant to admit that
they have been influenced by charges that the plaintiff claims are
baseless. e0 This is a healthy reluctance, based on the logical incon-
sistency of the witness's position, and it ought to be fostered rather
than ignored. Because truth is a universal defense to a defamation
action, the plaintiff necessarily is denying that the statement is
true. The witness, therefore, must contend either that he is not
sure whether to believe the plaintiff's protestations of innocence,
or that he thinks less highly of the plaintiff even though he be-
lieves the charge is false. The law should not release this witness
from his conundrum. The witness may testify, defense counsel may
confront him with the inconsistency, and the jury may decide what
to believe. To presume that the plaintiff's associates think less
highly of him even though they do not believe the accusation fore-
closes a legitimate factual issue.
Perhaps courts are more concerned about the opposite of the re-
luctant witness problem. They may fear that a plaintiff's friends
will be only too eager to say whatever will help him recover. This
phenomenon is not unique to defamation, however, and can be
dealt with as in other contexts: by the sanctions for perjury; by
cross-examination; and by allowing the jury to disbelieve the
witness.
Another justification offered for the presumed harm rule is that
the injury may be too subtle to prove.91 The answer to this is sim-
ply that law has its limits. The law offers no remedy for many inju-
ries in life. Affairs of the heart, for example, probably cause as
much mental anguish as all the cognizable torts combined, yet we
do not call on the law to aid the jilted lover. 92 Even with physical
justifies continuing the presumed harm doctrine. Litigation exacts many costs from its par-
ticipants. Being accused of lying about someone may be painful to the defendant, for exam-
ple, and may create doubts about his integrity or competence that even a judgment in his
favor would not erase. Costs such as these are real, but eliminating them is impossible.
90. See Developments, supra note 29, at 891-92.
91. Id. at 891.
92. When the law did make a foray into this area by recognizing causes of action for
seduction and breach of promise to marry, the legislatures of several states responded with
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torts, we do not feel compelled to offer a remedy if the injury is too
subtle to be proved. A plaintiff may be certain that his back is
injured, for example, but he can recover damages only if he can
prove it.
In addition to proving the defamation's effect on specific rela-
tionships, a plaintiff should be allowed to show by circumstantial
evidence that the defamation has harmed his relations generally.
For this purpose, courts should admit evidence that the plaintiff
has been denied membership in social or professional organizations
as proof that the defamation has affected relationships with other,
unspecified individuals. This evidentiary rule should extend to in-
formal relationships so that the plaintiff's perception that he is be-
ing shunned socially also would be admissible.
Proof of harm to future relations, like loss of future earnings or
future medical expenses in actions for physical torts, must be in-
ferred. The one factor most likely to support an inference of future
harm to reputation is harm to existing reputation. Conceivably, a
statement causing no immediate harm might injure reputation in
the future. As public attitudes or mores change, conduct that
seemed acceptable at the time it was imputed to the plaintiff may
become unacceptable. For example, segregationist political behav-
ior that might have been acceptable to the Alabama public in the
1960's9" might be unacceptable to the same constituency today. To
allow recovery for that possibility in the absence of immediate
harm, however, would be too speculative. The analogy to physical
torts would be to allow an accident victim who has suffered no ap-
parent injury to recover for the possibility that a symptom might
appear in the future. Although the possibility of a future symptom
is real, the courts do not allow such a claim in actions for physical
torts and one should not be allowed in defamation actions for the
same reason.
On the other hand, once a plaintiff establishes a present injury,
the jury should be free to infer that additional harm will occur in
the future, if the facts support that inference. Relevant facts in-
clude the permanence, prominence, and public accessibility of the
"heart-balm" statutes barring such actions. See Note, "Anti-Heart Balm" Legislation Re-
visited, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 538 (1961).
93. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 295 (1964) (Black, J., concurring).
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medium in which the defamation appears. Also relevant is the ex-
tent to which the plaintiff's reputation already has been vindi-
cated. In a highly publicized case in which the defendant admits
that the statement is false, for example, many people who become
aware of the defamation in the future probably will also be aware
of the vindication. In contrast, if the defendant insists that the
statement is true, a judgment for the plaintiff will not be a full
vindication of his reputation; some people still may believe that
the defendant was right. In such a case, the potential for future
harm is greater. Retraction is also relevant. While there is no cer-
tainty that a future reader of the defamation will see the retrac-
tion, the potential of an unretracted defamation to cause future
harm is greater.
Proving damage to public image will be an unfamiliar undertak-
ing for most lawyers, but it is not impossible. Gauging a celebrity's
popularity may be a mysterious process to most people, but in the
entertainment, advertising, sports, and communications industries,
it is daily business practice. One who has established a valuable
public image is likely to be knowledgeable about ways of demon-
strating the effect of a defamatory publication on that image.
Quantitative or qualitative changes in the plaintiff's fan mail
would be relevant, and print and electronic clipping services can
provide a sample of the media coverage of the plaintiff before and
after the defamation. If the plaintiff is a performer, ratings and
audience turnouts can provide a barometer of public acceptance.
If the alleged harm is the creation of a negative public image, a
plaintiff should be able to prove the existence of injury through the
testimony of people who had not heard of him previously, but who
now hold an unfavorable impression of him. He should be able to
show the extent of the injury through survey evidence showing the
portion of the population that heard and remembered the defama-
tory statement. 4
94. Professor Robertson points out that this evidentiary requirement may force the plain-
tiff to repeat the defamation in his attempt to find witnesses and to measure the extent of
the injury, thereby exacerbating his harm. But only in rare cases will the defamation be
sensational enough to be remembered by strangers. A defamation plaintiff always must
choose whether to suffer in silence or risk further harm to his reputation by litigating. If the
initial harm is widespread, the incremental harm caused by the process of gathering evi-
dence should be negligible. If the initial harm is not widespread, then the plaintiff can opt
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If the plaintiff proves one or more of these four types of actual
harm to reputation, he should then be allowed to show that the
defamation caused him mental anguish. This term includes at least
two distinct types of injury. The first type is the anguish that re-
sults from knowing the defamatory statement is in circulation. The
plaintiff may be apprehensive about the possible effect of the
statement. Just as one who believes that he is about to be struck
suffers a fear that is compensable in an action for assault, the vic-
tim of defamation may fear the effects of the verbal blow.
This apprehension is not necessarily limited to immediate ef-
fects. Mrs. Firestone testified, for example, that she feared her
young son would be affected adversely by the defamation on per-
manent record in Time magazine when he grew older.9 5 In any def-
amation case, but especially in those published in sources that will
continue to be publicly available, the victim may suffer anxiety
about effects that may occur far in the future. Whether the appre-
hension relates to the immediate or distant future, this form of
anxiety derives entirely from the statement's potential to harm
reputation; it is not an independent injury, but the apprehension
of a later independent injury.
The other type of mental anguish occurs independently of any
threat to reputation. This injury is the anger, hurt, or outrage that
the victim feels from the mere fact that someone would utter the
defamatory words. This harm would occur even if the statement
were never published to a third person. It is the type of injury that
is caused by insulting words, which a few states make actionable
even in the absence of publication to a third party.98 The general
rule, however, is that insults are not actionable as defamation.
"Words spoken that are merely vituperative, or insulting ... are
not regarded by the common law as sufficiently substantial to be
to minimize it by not gathering evidence.
95. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 461 (1976).
96. See, e.g., Fleming v. Moore, 221 Va. 884, 275 S.E.2d 632 (1981); Tweedy v. J.C. Pen-
ney Co., 216 Va. 596, 221 S.E.2d 152 (1976); Wright v. Cofield, 146 Va. 637, 131 S.E. 787
(1926). I am indebted to Professor John Donaldson of the Marshall-Wythe School of Law
for bringing to my attention recent cases involving the Virginia insulting words statute, VA.
CODE § 18.2-416 (1982). See also MIss. CODE ANN. § 95-1-1 (1972); W. VA. CODE § 61-3-33
(1977).
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treated as injuries calling for redress in damages."97 Even when an
actionable defamation occurs, the common law does not compen-
sate the plaintiff's purely internal reaction. "[T]he injury to feel-
ings which the law of defamation recognizes is the not the suffering
from the mere making of the charge, but is that suffering which is
caused by other people's conduct towards [the plaintiff] in conse-
quence of it.""5 If the gravamen of the tort of defamation is harm
to reputation, then the consequential damages for emotional harm
probably should be limited to those that arise from the reputa-
tional injury.99
A plaintiff must prove mental anguish largely through his own
testimony. The plaintiff may testify about specific manifestations
of his anguish, such as sleeplessness, nervousness, and depression,
and his family, associates, counselors, and physicians can corrobo-
rate or rebut his testimony. He should explain why he believed the
publication would make others think less highly of him because
this fact often will be a key point of contention. If the defamation
alleges conduct completely at odds with the plaintiff's good charac-
ter, the jury may be skeptical of the plaintiff's claims that he
feared he would be ruined. On the other hand, if the plaintiff's
character was bad, the jury may doubt that he is as sensitive to the
criticism as he claims to be. On the theory that a person of good
character is more likely to suffer genuine anguish from an accusa-
tion of misconduct than a person who is guilty, the court should
permit the defendant to demonstrate prior acts of misconduct by a
plaintiff who seeks recovery for mental anguish.100
In judging the plaintiff's claim of mental anguish, the jury inevi-
tably and properly will be influenced by the nature of the defama-
tion itself. Response to criticism is something within the experi-
ence of all jurors. They are as qualified as anyone to determine
what is hypersensitivity and what is genuine anguish. Allowing
them to extrapolate from their own experience and the nature of
the defamation is not the same as allowing them to presume
97. Moseley v. Moss, 47 Va. (6 Gratt.) 534, 538 (1850).
98. 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 209, at 704 (3d ed. 1940).
99. See Murnaghan, supra note 15, at 3 n.4; Developments, supra note 29, at 937.
100. This theory was first brought to my attention by Miss Ann Marie Reardon, a student
in my seminar at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law in the fall of 1983. I am indebted to
her for the insight.
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mental anguish. The plaintiff must offer evidence of the existence
and extent of any mental anguish, allowing the jurors to evaluate
the credibility of the plaintiff and his witnesses. Permitting the
jury to infer mental anguish from the evidence allows them to use
their intuition and experience; instructing them to presume it
counsels them to ignore those resources.
As previously discussed, 101 the presumed damage rule obviates
the need to show not only damage, but also causation. Its abolition,
therefore, would raise questions about proving causation as well as
harm. Direct proof of a causal link between the defamation and
the injury is sometimes impossible. Suppose, for example, that a
businessman is defamed, is able to show that his business declined
following the defamation, but is unable to show what caused the
decline. Under the presumed harm rule, the causation is presumed
along with the harm. The causation problem, however, does not
require such a sweeping presumption. Instead, the court should al-
low the jury to infer causation, but only after the plaintiff has es-
tablished actual injury. The plaintiff should be required to show
that he was defamed, that he suffered actual injury, and that the
defendant was the source of the defamatory statement. 10 2 The
plaintiff should be required to prove the loss by direct evidence,
such as sales records that document the decline. By doing so, he
proves the existence of actual injury and its amount. Once the
plaintiff makes that showing, the courts should allow a jury to in-
fer causation. If there is evidence that some of the harm might
have been caused by statements that are truthful or otherwise non-
actionable, the jury should be instructed that the defendant is lia-
ble only for the portion of the loss allocable to the actionable state-
ment.10 3 Unlike res ipsa loquitur, which allows the defendant's
negligence, as well as causation, to be inferred, the process de-
scribed here speaks only to the issue of causation. Neither goes as
far as the presumed harm doctrine, however, which obviates the
need to prove the existence of injury, the extent of injury, and the
causal connection.
101. See supra text accompanying note 84.
102. Foreseeable repetition of the defendant's statement by others is not an independent
source of injury. See, e.g., RESTATEMNT (SE cOND) OF TORTS § 576 (1976).
103. This view is only a variation on the existing rule that partial truth may be shown in
mitigation of damages. See McCormick, supra note 4, at 142.
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V. CONCLUSION
Compensating harm to reputation was not the original purpose
of slander and libel actions. The ecclesiastical courts took cogni-
zance of slander to protect the soul of the slanderer. Slander was
the cousin of blasphemy, and was proscribed for similar reasons. 0 4
Libel actions were created primarily as a means of protecting gov-
ernment from the power of the printing press. 10 5 Its purpose was
evident from its name: libel derives from the French term for a
political tract, which in turn comes from the Latin word for
book.1 6 Like many other torts, libel and slander actions evolved
from the criminal law, when the courts began to require the de-
fendant to compensate his victim as part of his punishment. 10 7
Today, we would not tolerate libel or slander actions if either
purported to serve its original purpose. We would be appalled at
the idea that the state has the power to punish a speaker for the
good of his soul, and we regard criticism of government as some-
thing to be nurtured, not punished. Actions for libel and slander
are retained only because they now serve a more legitimate pur-
pose-compensating individuals for injury to reputation. Requiring
proof of harm would reduce defamation to this purpose. The actual
injury rule would bring defamation into line with the rest of tort
law, which does not purport to punish wrongdoing or regulate ac-
tivity in the absence of injury.
An actual injury rule never will satisfy those who believe that
the real purpose of defamation law is to regulate the press. Some
people view tort law, and particularly defamation law, an opportu-
nity to regulate behavior. 08 Recognizing that the Supreme Court
will not permit direct regulation of the accuracy, responsibility,
and fairness of the press, these advocates-some of whom probably
104. See Veeder, supra note 60, at 550-51.
105. Id. at 561-66.
106. See 6 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 236 (1961).
107. Id. at 569-71.
108. See, e.g., Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law of Libel: The Modern Revised
Translation, 40 CORNuLL L.Q. 581, 582 (1964); Robertson, Defamation and the First
Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEx. L. REv. 199, 234 (1976);
Shapo, Media Injuries to Personality: An Essay on Legal Regulation of Public Communi-
cation, 46 Tsx. L. Rav. 650, 651-58 (1968).
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sit on the Court today'0 0-embrace libel law as a device by which
the courts can retain some control over the enormous power of the
press.
For these people, confining defamation law to the compensation
of actual injury is nonsense, because that is not its real purpose.
And if they are right-if press regulation is a permissible pur-
pose-then actual injury to reputation is not a logical requisite. In
my view, however, the government has no business regulating press
behavior in the guise of protecting individual reputation.1 '
A system that restricts recovery to actual loss will be imperfect,
but so is any system that attempts to compensate human injury
with money. Some deserving plaintiffs may be denied recovery be-
cause they are unable to prove that their harm is real. Other plain-
tiffs may be overcompensated in the imprecise process of attaching
a monetary value to mental anguish and the loss of public esteem.
On balance, however, requiring proof of injury offers several
benefits.
First, it will enable prospective plaintiffs and their lawyers to
appraise prospective claims more realistically. The potential wind-
fall of presumed damages makes rational evaluation almost impos-
sible. In most torts, the experienced plaintiff's lawyer can estimate
with some accuracy how much a case is "worth," and can base his
advice to the client and his own decision to accept the case on this
estimate. The inherent unpredictability of presumed damages,
however, makes rational calculation impossible in defamation
cases. Limiting recovery to actual loss should make awards more
predictable.
Second, the actual injury requirement will help weed out unmer-
itorious cases at an early stage. A plaintiff should be required to
plead with particularity the kind of harm that he has suffered.," If
he is unable to do so, he has failed to state a cause of action, and
his suit should be dismissed. If a plaintiff successfully pleads ac-
109. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 104 S. Ct. 1473, 1479 (1984) ("False statements of
fact harm both the subject of the falsehood and the readers of the statement. New Hamp-
shire may rightly employ its libel laws to discourage the deception of its citizens.").
110. See Anderson, A Response to Professor Robertson: The Issue Is Control of.Press
Power, 54 Tax. L. REv. 271 (1976).
111. The pleading rules that apply to special damages offer a convenient analogy. See,
e.g., FED. R. Cirv. P. 9(g); R. SACK, supra note 16, at 101-02.
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tual injury, but there is no evidence to support it, the defendant
may be entitled to summary judgment." 2 Knowledge that a court
will confine any award to actual loss should facilitate settlement
negotiations because both sides will have a more realistic, predict-
able basis for estimating the value of the claim.
Finally, if all the previous safeguards fail, appellate courts will
have a record against which they can independently evaluate the
award. With presumed harm, they have no basis for evaluating
damages except for the nature of the defamatory statement itself.
Assigning a monetary value to loss of reputation will remain a
difficult and inexact process. Requiring proof of loss introduces
some new problems, such as proof of causation, that the presumed
harm rule finesses. An actual injury requirement will not always
put exactly the right amount of money in the right hands, but I
believe it will be less imperfect than the presumed harm system.
Subjecting defamation to the same proof demands as other torts
requires some demystification of reputation. Reputation is some-
thing we have all been taught to cherish, like honor and patriotism.
Respect for its value is passed down to each generation by the ora-
cles of our culture. The Old Testament teaches us that "[a] good
name is rather to be chosen than great riches." 1 3 Shakespeare
wrote:
Good name in man and woman, dear my lord,
Is the immediate jewel of their souls:
112. The defendant bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of mate-
rial fact, of course, but experience with the actual malice issue demonstrates that courts can
use modern summary judgment practice effectively to make the plaintiff produce his evi-
dence. When the ground for summary judgment is lack of actual malice, the defendant of-
fers affidavits and depositions to show that he had no reason to doubt the truth of his
statement. Many judges then will grant the motion unless the plaintiff shows that he has
some chance of proving the contrary. Although Chief Justice Burger expressed doubt about
this practice, see Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 120 n.9 (1979), it continues to be
common in both federal and state courts. See LmEL DEFENSE RESOURCE CENTER, BULL. No.
4, SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN LEBEL LITIGATION: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF Hutchinson v.
Proxmire 2-35 (1982); Kovner, Motion for Summary Judgment, in NEw YORK TIMES V. SUL-
LIVAN: THE NEXT TwENTY YEARS 316-21 (R. Winfield ed. 1984). To initiate the same process
when the ground for the motion is lack of actual injury, the defendant could produce affida-
vits or depositions from reputation witnesses who could testify that the plaintiff's reputation
has not been harmed. If the plaintiff cannot produce summary judgment proof to the con-
trary, the motion should be granted.
113. Proverbs 22:1.
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Who steals my purse steals trash; 'tis something,
nothing,
'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands;
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him,
And makes me poor indeed." 4
Life teaches us to be wary of those who invoke the name of
honor or patriotism, however, and a bit of the same skepticism
probably should attach to claims made in the name of reputation.
We should remember that Shakespeare also said "[r]eputation is
an idle and most false imposition, oft got without merit, and lost
without deserving. ' '115
Many of our ideas about reputation are products of a simpler
era. When most people spent their entire lives in one community,
and the community value system was narrowly drawn and widely
shared, good reputation was painstakingly earned, easily lost, and
not readily rebuilt. Today most of us move from one community to
another, not only geographically, but also socially and profession-
ally. Whatever reputation we have in each of those communities
may be recently acquired and shallowly based.
Knowing this, those with whom we deal often decline to trust in
something as ephemeral as reputation. For most of us, a lifetime of
scrupulous honesty and meticulous checkbook-balancing will not
enable us to cash a ten-dollar check at the grocery store without
photographic identification, a personal check, and a name that
does not appear on the county attorney's current list of deadbeats.
In today's pluralistic society, much is tolerated and little is univer-
sally condemned. A congressman can be the subject of a sex scan-
dal one year and win an election the next.110 An entertainer can
pursue drug abuse to the brink of death and return more popular
than ever.117 Behavior that outrages adults can make a musician
114. W. SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDiE OF OTHELLO, THE MOORE OF VENICE II:iii, at 155-
161 (1602).
115. Id. I:iii, at 268-270.
116. See Percy and Rep. Crane Renominated in Illinois, N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1984, at
14, col. 5 (Y ed.) ("For the 47-year-old Mr. Crane, the scene at his victory party at a Dan-
ville, Ill., restaurant was a far cry from his apologetic return last summer after being cen-
sured by House colleagues for sexual relations with a 17-year-old female page.").
117. See Pryor's Back-Twice as Funny, TIME, Mar. 29, 1982, at 62-63.
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the idol of millions of teenagers. Even if one's reputation is
harmed, the victim is not condemned automatically to live out his
life in disgrace. The mobility and anonymity of modern society
make rehabilitation much easier.
This is not meant to denigrate the importance of reputation or
the reality of its loss. It does suggest though, that before the law
leaps to protect reputation it should demand the same proof of loss
that is required of every other interest that tort law protects.
